Corruption: Classification and analysis by Graycar, Adam
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons: http://
dspace.flinders.edu.au/dspace/ 
‘This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Graycar, Adam  (2015) Corruption: Classification and 
analysis,  Policy and Society vol. 34 (2), 87-96   http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.001
which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.001
Copyright © 2015 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). 
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This manuscript version is made 
available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Graycar, Adam  (2015) Corruption: Classification and analysis,  Policy and Society vol. 34 (2), 
87-96   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.001
Corruption and Policy 
Abstract 
Corruption demoralizes government and weakens the whole endeavour of 
policy formulation and its implementation.  It diminishes services and causes 
fiscal stress, but most of all it undermines trust and corrodes legitimate 
community expectations.  Corruption takes many forms and is found in many 
contexts.  This paper develops a framework for the analysis of corruption 
which identifies types, activities, sectors and places (TASP).  With the TASP 
framework identified or suspected corruption in any setting can be analysed as 
a precursor to the controls and processes that are most appropriate for the 
control and modification of corrupt behaviour, which ideally can enhance 
public sector performance.  The TASP framework assists in pinpointing the 
nature, location and context of public sector corruption, and illustrates more 
precisely where the risks of corrupt activity might arise.   . This paper 
demonstrates , with empirical work from New York City and the State of 
Victoria in Australia (Australia’s second most populous state),  that more 
precise classification and characterisation of the nature and types of corrupt 
activity is an essential  precondition to the development and design  of 
targeted  anti-corruption measures.  
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The questions that this paper seeks to address are what is the nature of public 
sector corruption in all its varieties, where might it be located (whether agency 
or place specific or across public and private sectors or otherwise) whether and 
how corruption may be measured, and what sorts of risks are perceived for 
potential corruption in public services. 
Newspaper headlines in 2013 reported that Xi Jinping, soon to become 
Premier of China vowed to fight 'tigers' and 'flies' in his anti-corruption drive.  
"We must uphold the fighting of tigers and flies at the same time” he said, 
“resolutely investigating law-breaking cases of leading officials and also 
earnestly resolving the unhealthy tendencies and corruption problems which 
happen all around people." (Guardian, Jan 22, 2013). 
Across the Pacific Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig (2011) demonstrates 
that there are two types of corruption that shape American policy making.  On 
the one hand there are the well known and observed phenomena of bribery, 
extortion, pay to play, misappropriation, nepotism etc.  These are primarily in 
the realm of the “flies”, but not exclusively so.  More pervasive and insidious, 
he argues is the dependence that legislators have on campaign donors and 
other stakeholders.  The billions of dollars that come to Congress members and 
senators do not normally come with strict and specific strings attached, though 
there are cases when powerful interests are clearly favoured.  There is a more 
insidious situation of congressmen not wanting to support policies or programs 
that might upset their donors.  This dependency on campaign funds and 
alignment with interests distorts the process, but there is no clear personal 
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dollar gainfor the congressmen, other than furtherance of their  career.  In 
essence Lessig argues (p. 234) it is not just the bad people who effect 
corruption, but the institutions that make it possible.  The US Supreme Court 
insists on a high bar of proof as to the possibility of a specific ‘quid pro quo “in 
validating legislation dealing with limits on electoral campaign spending 
(Teachout, 2014). 
This makes for a very difficult analytical situation for it is not appropriate to 
apply the same controls on the one hand to a municipal officer who harasses a 
street vendor, and extorts a payment so that the vendor can keep his cart in a 
good spot, as it is on the other hand to examine inducements to ensure that 
legislation can be written favourably to benefit a corporation or an industry. 
Corruption exists in both rich countries and in poor countries, but the nature, 
extent and overall dynamics of corruption are respectively very different.  In 
the literature we can find cases, mostly in poor countries, that show that 
corruption is a major factor in a wide variety of domains:  water shortages in 
many arenas, illegal logging in pristine forests, justice administration 
compromised, health services unfairly delivered with people dying because of 
corrupt public policy decisions, educational opportunity denied, military 
procurement distorted, roads poorly constructed, and often going nowhere 
important, people unable to access clean water, telecommunications 
infrastructure that excludes many, appalling responses to natural disasters, 
corrupt regulatory behaviour in the extractive industries, man-made famine, 
just to mention the most obvious. 
In rich countries the basic bribes that characterise so much of every day life in 
poorer countries are not present, but where they are exposed there is strong 
public outrage.  The syndromes of corruption, described by Michael Johnston a 
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decade ago (Johnston, 2005) locate different corruption scenarios in different 
contexts.   
Johnston shows that in the case of weak undemocratic state corruption there 
is little or no societal protection against corruption, and kleptocracy (rule of 
thieves), patronage and intimidation prevail.  Political and economic 
institutions are weak and there are numerous examples of the unjust 
enrichment of family and friends of the leaders, not to mention pervasive 
bribery and extortion at all levels. Institutions are also weak in transitional 
states where there are weak or ineffectual state mechanisms of control, and 
thus corruption thrives.  This is in contrast to mature state corruption where 
influence is more subtly traded, connections are made for a fee, and wealth is 
used to gain access to decision makers , which results in the sharing the spoils 
such as contracts, mining, energy or other natural resource concessions and 
favourable laws. Johnston has extended his analysis further (Johnston, 2013).  
In these rich countries influence markets and shades of grey weave their way 
through transactions, so much so that the tracking of Xi Jinping’s tigers is such 
a different activity to the swatting of flies 
Finland is a country regarded as one of the least corrupt in the world 
(Transparency International, 2014)  A recent analysis by the Finnish Ministry of 
Justice pointed out that petty corruption, the activities of “flies” or “corruption 
on the streets” is measurable by the number of cases brought before the 
authorities, and these are very small.  The culture in Finland is such that 
corrupt behaviours of this sort would be immediately reported.  On the other 
hand, grand corruption (“corruption in the suites”) is much harder to identify 
as it is woven into the fabric of business and public-private sector dealings  and 
is less likely to come to the attention of the authorities  (Joutsen & Keranen, 
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2009).  In these sorts of activities there is often a mixing of legal and illegal, 
ethical and unethical behaviours, and much debate about where lines are 
drawn.   
Traditional analyses refer to petty corruption (flies), grand corruption (tigers) 
and “state capture.”  
Petty corruption is characterised by lower level officials who may have 
opportunities to  do things that are wrong, such as  using one’s office to falsify 
records that result in a person not having to pay a tax, and in so doing receive a 
kickback.  They might fail to do things that one should do, such as a male police 
officer failing to issue a ticket to an attractive female driver who has been 
stopped for excessive speed.  Or they might do something permissible, but 
purposely do it in an improper manner such as issuing a permit for an activity 
that meets the criteria, but allow it to come to the front of the line in return for 
a personal benefit or favour.  Civil servants who engage in such behaviour, and 
who receive benefits other than their salary are breaching the trust of their 
office. 
This is very different to the “grand corruption” so often described in the 
literature (Hellman, Jones et al., 2000; Johnston, 2005; Pope, 1995) where 
politicians manipulate the instruments of the state for their own personal 
benefit, and thus terribly distort policy, to the point they effectively ‘own’ the 
state and its institutions and resources. 
Rather than officials shaking down citizens or kleptocrats dominating business 
and stealing the country’s assets, a “state capture” situations arise where 
legislation, formally developed and properly passed by the legislature or 
parliament, grants benefits in a corrupt manner.  Outside interests not only 
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bend state laws, but use their corrupt influence to have laws written for their 
benefit. Powerful interests can influence or bribe officials and parliamentarians 
to write legislation that might give a company access to the exploitation of 
natural resources, a monopoly on a railway line, media and publishing licences 
or exemption from the payment of taxes.   
In transitional economies there is great vulnerability to state capture.  In Russia 
as the economy transitioned from communism to capitalism during the 1990s 
many state enterprises were privatised.  In many cases favours were 
exchanged for such assets.  Factories were privatised and some state assets 
were disposed of corruptly, though with formal legislation.  Oil and gas 
exploration and transmission was expanded, and huge investments were made 
in pipelines and transport arrangements.  Legislation was written to grant 
exclusivity, set tax rates, and set regulatory arrangements.  Politicians who in 
effect wrote the legislation were rewarded handsomely.  Sometimes they were 
made company directors and received regular income flows, but overall they 
sold their legislative integrity.  (Yakovlev & Zhuravskaya, 2006) 
It is not only in transitional economies that there is state capture.  There is a 
fine line between lobbying in a democratic system where on behalf of 
companies or industry associations, lobbyists seek to have legislation written 
to favour their activities or to disadvantage competitors.  Sometimes this is 
done corruptly with payments of cash, sometimes with gifts, sometimes subtly 
with contributions to political campaigns, or by donations to causes supported 
by the politician.   
Working through this variety of contexts in which corruption may occur it can 
be seen that corruption poses challenges for the development and 
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maintenance of sound public policy, and for the corresponding efficient and 
effective performance of government. 
 
Understanding corruption  
A great deal of effort is expended on defining corruption, and analysing the 
nuances.  When applied to a civil service setting, corruption involves the 
unauthorized trading of one’s entrusted authority.  A civil servant receives a 
salary to perform those tasks for which s/he has authorized delegation.  If the 
civil servant does not perform the tasks, or does not perform them well, there 
may be misconduct, or some form of maladministration (Caiden, 1991).  This is 
different to corruption, where a personal benefit, other than one’s salary is 
received.  The benefit might not always be in cash.  It could involve favours, 
holidays, sexual services, inappropriate hospitality or preferment for oneself or 
one’s family (child being admitted to prestigious college when they don’t meet 
admission standards).   
There are many motives, including pleasing superiors or not “ratting” on work 
colleagues.   However, mostly there is greed, and  in developing countries 
there is often need, as civil servants often are forced to eke out a living on 
subsistence wages.  Sometimes the corrupt activity is done to exhibit 
patronage, and demonstrate that one can deliver for families, cronies, lovers 
or friends (Gounev, Dzhekova et al., 2012).  There are times when the context 
of the behavior is structural – that is the agency or the organisation tolerates 
breaches of integrity and poor and corrupt practice is embedded in the culture, 
and there are times when it is opportunistic, such as where a highway patrol 
officer or a health inspector can fail to issue a violation in return for some 
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personal consideration, cash or otherwise.  The participants may be in 
collusion, and thus all parties are willing, or on the other hand the civil servant 
might be extorting the other, and thus we have highly unwilling participants.  
These concepts have been explored elsewhere in more depth (Graycar & 
Prenzler, 2013, p.28-31). 
Corruption is not an easily defined concept.  In general terms, legislative 
attempts to exhaustively define the boundaries of “corruption“ fail, given the 
protean nature of the phrase. Corruption comprehends and encompasses  
many types of behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, cronyism, misuse of 
information, abuse of discretion.  These behaviours can take place by way of  
different activities such as appointing personnel, procuring services, 
controlling and regulating activities such as issuing permits and licences, 
constructing things etc. Many of these occur concurrently in different sectors 
such as health, energy delivery, tax administration, justice etc, and in different 
places, such as regions, localities or specific workplaces.  These concepts, 
described elsewhere as TASP (types, activities, sectors, places) provide a 
framework for the analysis of corrupt events in the public sector.  Table 1 
illustrates the framework. 
Rather than using the blanket term “corruption” to describe a range of events, 
for analytic purposes corrupt events can be located within the TASP 
framework. For example there might be bribery (type) in procurement 
(activity) in mining (sector) in South Africa or in a particular mine (place).  
There could be nepotism in personnel management in health in a particular 
hospital.  By analysing these respective and distinctive components there can 
be greater understanding and realistic strategies developed as counter 
measures. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
 
An analytically useful tool is to determine what it is that is being corrupted in 
the public sector setting, an event, a process or a culture, or a mixture of 
these. In terms of risk management processes , where and in what way  does 
the risk actually arise ?   Untangling what it is that is being corrupted (or is 
likely to be corrupted) will be a necessary and substantial   aid in the 
development of preventive actions or countermeasures.  In essence there may 
be occasions when events are corrupted, on other occasions processes are 
corrupted, and at other times cultures are corrupted. 
Events: Specific activities such as those reported below in the New York cases 
involved the payment of bribes, looking the other way, altering records etc. 
Processes: As perceived by civil servants, corrupt processes are those which 
allow abuse of discretion, conflict of interest, hiring of family and friends, 
hiring one’s own company for government contracts, perversion of the course 
of justice etc. 
Generally corruption of events and processes come about in the 
implementation of public policy.  Officials do a task, and if, in return for a 
benefit other than their salary they do not do it as required or do it selectively, 
or exhibit favouritism then they behave corruptly. 
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Culture:  When we turn to corrupting of cultures, we see a bigger picture.  We 
often see poor political leadership and whether in political or administrative 
circles, a lack of “tone at the top”. 
Corrupt organisations have been built on corrupt cultures as we saw in the 
state of Queensland (Australia) in the 1970s and 1980s where ministers and 
civil servants took huge financial benefits from corporations they were 
regulating; where police ran gambling and prostitution and were protected by 
politicians who also benefitted, and who legislated the very poor policy that 
created opportunities for the corrupt culture to flourish (Condon, 2013; 
Prenzler, 2011; Wanna & Arklay, 2010a; Williams, 1991). Cultures of “pay to 
play” have influenced policy directions and gaming of systems has distorted 
policy and created cultures of corruption (Lessig, 2011; Salter, 2010).  
These dispositions will now  be probed by exploring two contrasting pieces of 
empirical work on public sector corruption, but with the deployment of the 
TASP framework.   The first was a study of corruption in New York City, in 
which 100 cases of corruption were prosecuted by the City’s anti-corruption 
agency, the Department of Investigations.  The methodology involved taking 
100 chronologically consecutive cases in 2009. The second was a study of 
perceptions of corruption and corruption opportunities and risks among senior 
civil servants in the government of Victoria, Australia’s second largest state by 
population. This involved a questionnaire responded to by 839 senior civil 
servants in January 2013.Accordingly, this TASP analysis concentrates first on 
proven examples of corruption ( the New York cases), and then applying the 
TASP mechanism, examines  the research study on perceptions of corruption in  
the Victorian public sector  .    
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Measurement issues: a cautionary note.  
It should be noted that measuring corruption is an activity that is fraught with 
methodological challenges (For more on measurement issues see Kaufmann, 
Kraay et al., 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2007; Sampford, Shacklock et al., 
2006).  It is however important to try to measure corruption for two main 
reasons.  First, it is an indicator of how well a society is performing in terms of 
a government’s contract or covenant with its citizens.  If there is bribery, 
extortion, misappropriation, self-dealing; if major capital and development 
projects serve an individual’s financial interests rather than the public interest; 
if corporations bribe public officials to exploit natural resources; if human 
rights abuses are tolerated; if justice administration is inconsistent with the 
rule of law; then that society is more corrupt than those in which these 
behaviours are less or not part of the social fabric.  Second, if we know how 
much corruption there is within a jurisdiction and the nature and quantity of 
those corrupt events, then remedial actions can be put in place and preventive 
measures can be implemented. 
However, the administrative data on corruption is, and will always be, 
incomplete. As the activity is nearly always clandestine and covert, then it is in 
neither party’s interest to report it in a survey and have the activity counted in 
any way..  If the corrupt behaviour was reported, and if a charge were brought 
it might be classified as obtaining money with menaces, some form of theft, or 
breach of a public service provision.  Many other infractions under these 
headings might be defined as misconduct rather than corruption, making it 
difficult to disentangle figures, and the real nature and extent of any corrupt 
behaviour.    
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Because of its clandestine nature many of the measures of corruption are not 
therefore measures of corrupt behaviour, but instead measures of people’s 
perception of corruption – perceptions of its incidence and perceptions of its 
nature (de Lancer Julnes & Villoria, 2014; Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, 35). They 
are, in effect, proxy measurements. These are not measures of the damage 
caused by corruption. Also it cannot be assumed that perceptions translate 
into incidence or help us understand prevalence.   It is precisely because of the 
difficulty in administratively counting corruption that many of the measures of 
corruption we see are not therefore measures of corrupt behaviour, but are 
indicators of concern or suspicion rather than solid criminological data. 
Accordingly, surveys which purport to measure mere suspicions of corruption, 
but without evidence, proof, report or complaint are not necessarily helpful in 
determining the true nature and extent of corruption in any society.  
 
Corruption in practice 
The cases listed here from the New York study (Graycar & Villa, 2011) illustrate 
they sort of corruption issues that the Department of Investigations (DOI) 
encounters.  This is quite a large fly swatting exercise.  These cases are a small 
selection from a large data base held by the author.  Full details of these and 
many more can be found on the DOI website.  The TASP framework (Table 1 
above) has been applied, though in all of these cases place is NYC, an urban 
environment, whereas similar analysis in a non-urban setting could be 
expected to illustrate different dynamics.   
‒ a crew chief with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation 
(DPR), received a $60 bribe from a DOI undercover investigator posing as 
13 
 
an Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP) participant in exchange for 
buying his way out of two days of court-ordered community service in 
McCarren Park in Brooklyn.  In the TASP analysis the type of corruption 
was abuse of discretion; the activity was administration of justice; the 
sector was local government and the place was a park in Brooklyn. 
(corrupt event) 
‒ A plumbing inspector employed with the New York City Department of 
Buildings (DOB), solicited and accepted a $500 bribe from a plumbing 
contractor in exchange for filing false certificates of inspection with the 
DOB. He also falsely claimed that he had performed mandated 
inspections on two residential sewer connections.  Type: bribery; 
Activity inspecting/ issuing permit; Sector: Environment and Water. 
(corrupt event) 
‒ Seven employees of the New York City Human Resources 
Administration/ Department of Social Services and eight other 
individuals generated Medicaid cards (meant for the city’s neediest and 
most vulnerable people) in exchange for a cash fee of approximately 
$300-$400 per card. This scheme led to the Medicaid Program losing an 
estimated $3.9 million.  Type: misappropriation/ abuse of discretion; 
Activity: administering; : Sector: Health  (corrupt process) Place a 
section within an agency.  
‒ A technician accepted a $100 bribe to alter drug test results. Her role 
was to collect urine samples as part of pre-employment testing of all job 
applicants for the New York City Housing Authority.  Type: bribe; 
Activity: administering; Sector: housing. (corrupt event) 
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‒ Four building contractors paid USD$ 500 to a supposed Department of 
Buildings Agent, to overlook several building code violations related to 
scaffolding safety issues.  Type: bribery; Activity: ensuring safety; Sector: 
construction. (corrupt event) 
‒ A clerical assistant of the Administration for Children Services (ACS), 
used the names and social security numbers belonging to children in ACS 
foster care programs, and fraudulently claimed them as dependants on 
tax returns that he prepared for his clients. The clerk charged each tax 
client $500 for each child added and gave some of that money to his 
associate within the service. Type: misuse of information; Activity: 
delivering programs; Sector: human services. (corrupt process) 
‒ An Inspector of the City Department of Buildings (DOB) was offered a 
$300 payment to not to issue a violation and stop work order for failing 
constructions plans in Manhattan.  Type: bribe; Activity: controlling 
activity; Sector: construction. (corrupt event) 
The study that first analysed these cases and others, found that what the city 
lost most was governance capacity (Graycar & Villa, 2011).  This meant that the 
city found its policy and procedures violated by corrupt acts. Interestingly, the 
capacity loss to the city benefitted private individuals more than the civil 
servants.  The civil servants received small amounts of money for what in many 
cases were compromises or neglect of safety requirements or violations of 
procedures. 
The study also found that the initiative for corrupt activity came equally from 
civil servants and members of the public.  Eighty percent of the civil servant 
offenders acted alone, though there were some notable cases of people 
15 
 
perpetrating their corrupt activities in a group.  Where this happened there 
were either management failures or poor culture and adherence to ethical 
standards.  Some positions have greater opportunity, and this applies 
particularly to inspectors who have a great deal of discretion, and often 
monopoly power.  Half of the cases studied involved inspectors, and a further 
quarter very low-level workers.  Of the 100 consecutive cases only five 
involved politicians. 
A different type of study was conducted in Victoria, Australia.  A newly formed 
anti-corruption authority wanted to assess the extent of corrupt activity, and 
the perceptions of both the general public and civil servants of corruption in 
the state.  
In Australia, a federal country with a parliamentary system, preventing 
corruption has not been a matter that is high on the policy agenda.  Over the 
years there have been a small number of experiences of politicians making 
corrupt and inappropriate decisions, taking payments from corporations, 
engaging in activities that demonstrate conflict of interest, and when instances 
of such behavior become public they receive a great deal of media attention 
and community abhorrence (Condon, 2013; Prenzler, 2011; Wanna & Arklay, 
2010b).   In 1988 the state of New South Wales, the largest state (by 
population) established an anti-corruption agency, the ICAC, (modelled on the 
Hong Kong ICAC) and over the next 25 years each of the states established an 
anti-corruption authority of some sort.  There has been debate, though it has 
now subsided to some extent, about whether there should be a federal anti-
corruption commission (Hindess, 2003; Roberts, 2005; Uhr, 2005). 
In 2013 the state of Victoria established an anti-corruption commission and the 
commissioned a research project to discover how the general public perceived 
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corruption in Victoria, how the media reported it, how civil servants perceived 
and experienced corruption, how integrity was managed within government 
agencies and how integrity agencies in general carved out their work and what 
they did.  What is reported here are a few salient features from the national 
survey and from a survey of senior civil servants.  (For a description of more of 
the findings see Graycar, 2014) 
A national poll was conducted to ascertain perceptions of corruption and the 
results showed that 
 43% of the Australian population believe that corruption has increased in 
the past three years. 
 Respondents had exceptionally little personal experience of bribery by 
government officials. 
 1 in 5 report that state and local government are affected by corruption; 1 
in 3 report that federal government is affected by corruption. 
 If corruption is suspected or observed, half of the respondents would not 
know where to report it. 
 Two thirds of respondents had little confidence in federal or state 
government. 
 Institutions that people believe are most affected by corruption are the 
media, trade unions and political parties. 
 Institutions that people believe are least affected by corruption are the 
armed forces, police and the public service. 
Full details of methodology and full findings can be found in the survey report 
(McAllister, Pietsch et al., 2012).  In focus groups, participants felt that 
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corruption was increasing, but very few people could cite an actual example of 
a corrupt event that personally affected them or their family.  Of around 5000 
media mentions of corruption in Victorian newspapers, very few related to 
corruption in Victoria.  
So what we have in Australia is a situation where there is a belief that 
corruption is, if not rampant, at least present, yet it does not take the form of 
types most commonly associated with corruption, namely bribery, extortion, 
misappropriation etc. 
The results from the survey of senior civil servants shed new light on the 
nature of corruption as perceived in the implementation of policy. 
A total of 839 senior civil servants from across the spectrum of state 
government responded to a questionnaire on perceptions of corruption.  17% 
thought that corruption had increased in Victoria in the past 5 years, while 9% 
thought it had decreased. Notably 42% did not know (see Figure 1).  This 
compares to 43% of the general public believing it to have increased and 9% 
believing it to have decreased.  Interestingly, within the respondents’ own 
departments corruption was generally perceived as low with two-thirds 
indicating there was little or no corruption in their agency. However, many 
suspected corruption in other agencies. Those in central agencies (Premier’s 
Department, Treasury) thought there was less corruption in their agencies than 
did people in line agencies (agencies that deliver services such as transport, 
infrastructure, education and social services etc). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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Respondents were asked about corruption opportunities, risks, suspicions and 
observations. Most frequently identified opportunities for corruption within 
department/agency were conflict of interest, followed by misuse of 
information, abuse of discretion and hiring friends or family for public service 
jobs.  Corruption risks in relation specific public sector activities were generally 
rated as low. The most commonly identified potential corruption risks were in 
relation to appointing personnel, buying goods and services and partnerships 
with private sector.  Behaviours most commonly suspected and observed were 
hiring family and friends, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion and abuse of 
information. 
In the survey question the activities, of the above TASP analysis (Table 1) were 
probed.  Those activities suggested as having the greatest risk were appointing 
personnel, buying goods and services and partnerships with the private sector.  
There are certainly risk mitigation strategies that can be put in place to deal 
with these.  Interestingly the respondents ranked a number of activities as 
containing risk or little or no risk.  These are in table 2 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
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It is interesting to examine the differences between what respondents saw as 
opportunities for corrupt behaviour and what they actually observed.  In this 
question the types of the above TASP analysis were probed.  More than half 
believed there were opportunities for conflict of interest; misuse of 
information or material; abuse of discretion; or hiring friends or family for civil 
service jobs.  (see table 3).  About half of those who thought there was an 
opportunity had suspected that behaviour, and half of those who suspected 
had actually observed.  Even so, with between 15% and 25% of respondents 
observing these things, there is a definite set of tasks for civil service leaders in 
developing strategies to combat and control these activities. 
In contrast, bribery, which is seen as the bane of public service, was suspected 
by 4% and observed by less than 1%, though almost one third thought there 
might be opportunities for bribery.  There are many interpretations of this 
data.  Perhaps opportunities exist, but civil servants vigorously eschew these 
opportunities.  Perhaps opportunities exist, and civil servants who offend, 
cover their tracks so very well.  The former seems the more likely in the 
Victorian situation. 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
The survey concluded with two open-ended questions.  To the question that 
asked what were emerging corruption risks for their departments, 36% 
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responded “abuse of power”, and no other response elicited more than 8%. To 
the question ‘what would be the most damaging acts of corruption facing the 
Victorian government’ 56% responded “bribery” and the second highest 
response was “abuse of discretion” at 12%.  This is a particularly interesting 
response as it demonstrates the corrosive  damage that a bribery culture could 
have, even though bribery was barely suspected, and negligibly observed.  The 
real risks it seems are in abuse of power, abuse of discretion, and nepotism 
and cronyism. 
One in ten respondents had reported corruption, though detailed analysis of 
corruption reports to integrity agencies in Australia shows that many of these 
reports are about misconduct and maladministration.  Of course these 
behaviors can very easily morph into corruption, and are often perceived by 
the public as corruption.  They severely damage the ability of the civil service 
to deliver with efficiency and integrity.  Less than half, however (42%) thought 
their report of corruption had been handled effectively.  Almost half of the 
respondents did not feel confident they would be protected from victimisation 
should they report corruption. Those who felt less confident were more junior 
(of the senior ranks) and more likely to be in line agencies than central 
agencies, especially in human and community services. The effectiveness of 
one’s department/agency integrity framework was generally rated highly with 
three times as many respondents thinking their department/agency’s strategy 
was effective compared to those who thought it was ineffective. However one-
tenth of the respondents were not aware of the existence of an integrity 
framework within their Department/Agency. 
 
Conclusion 
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Working from the empirical material the following conclusions can be drawn.  
Cultures that are corrupted lead to distortions in the making of policy.  
Examples of this are regarded as particularly egregious in developed countries, 
and these become the subject of major scandals.  We all expect better of our 
political leaders, and turn on them when they create a culture of corruption. 
In the implementation of policy both events and processes can be corrupted.  
Often the financial gains to the individual and the loss to the government are 
not large, but trust is diminished and governance capacity compromised.  
Survey work shows that in a well-functioning civil service the traditional forms 
of corruption, bribery, extortion and misappropriation are not the major actual 
or even perceived forms of corruption.  Most frequently these are conflict of 
interest, misuse of information and hiring of friends and families. Bribery 
however remains at the top of the list as a potential threat to good 
governance. 
The cultures of corruption can be addressed by focussing on major system 
wide pillars of integrity.  The process and events that are corrupted can be 
addressed not only by focussing on integrity measures, but also by focussing 
on situational prevention measures. In this respect, the use of the TASP 
classification framework of corruption (whether actual, suspected or 
otherwise) should serve as an essential condition precedent and analytical tool 
to aid the design of effective anti-corruption measures.  (these have been 
explored elsewhere by the author).  These preventive measures will be the 
subject of a different paper. 
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Table 1. Examples of Type, Activities, Sectors and Places (TASP) of Corruption 
Type Activities Sectors Places 
 
 Bribery 
 Extortion 
 Misappropriation 
 Self-dealing 
 Patronage  
 Abuse of discretion 
 Misuse of 
information 
 Creating or 
exploiting  
conflict of interest 
 Nepotism, 
clientelism and 
favouritism 
 
etc 
 
 Appointing personnel 
 Buying things 
(Procurement) 
 Delivering programs or 
services 
 Making things 
(Construction / 
manufacturing) 
 Rebuilding things (after a 
disaster) 
 Controlling activities 
(Licensing / regulation/ 
issuing of permits) 
 Administering (justice for 
example) 
 
etc 
 
 Construction 
 Health 
 Tax administration  
 Energy 
 Environment and water 
 Forestry 
 Customs and 
Immigration 
 Legal system 
 Disaster relief 
 Education 
 
etc 
 
 
 Countries 
 Regions 
 Localities 
 Work places 
 
etc 
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Table 2 
Perception of riska of corruption at respondent's department N=839 
  
Risk 
(%) 
Not a risk 
(%) 
 
Appointing personnel 29.1 47.3 
 
Buying goods or services 24.5 48.6 
 
Partnership with private sector 22.7 52.3 
 
Controlling activities 22.6 56.6 
 
Ensuring compliance with procedures 18.2 54.8 
 
Grant administration 15.5 63.4 
 
Disposal and sale of organisational assets 14.0 65.0 
 
Using discretionary powers 13.3 63.0 
 
Sponsorship arrangements 12.6 66.3 
 
    
    
Note: 
a, An activity was deemed to be considered a "Risk" if it was rated 4 or 5 and "Not a risk" if 
it was rated 1 or 2 on a 5 point scale (where 1 meant not a risk and 5 a major risk). 
Percentage values for rating of 3 are not presented in this graphs, but were included in the 
computation. Answers of "Don't know/Not applicable were excluded from computation. 
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Table 3 
Corruption in Department/Agency  N=839 
 
 Opportunity % Suspected % Observed% 
Base: Total sample  839 839 839 
Conflict of interest 72 38 20 
Misuse of info or material 68 32 15 
Abuse of discretion 58 28 15 
Hiring friends or family for 
public service jobs 
53 38 25 
Hiring one’s own or family 
company  to provide services 
33 18 9 
Bribery 32 4 1 
Perverting the course of 
justice 
16 3 2 
Don’t know  3 6 4 
Prefer not to say 0 1 4 
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FIGURE 1 
Perceived change in level of corruption in Victoria  (N= 839) 
 
 
N=839 
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